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AVISPAAbstract Wireless body area networks (WBANs) can be applied to provide healthcare and patient
monitoring. However, patient privacy can be vulnerable in a WBAN unless security is considered.
Access to authorized users for the correct information and resources for different services can be
provided with the help of efﬁcient user access control mechanisms. This paper proposes a new user
access control scheme for a WBAN. The proposed scheme makes use of a group-based user access
ID, an access privilege mask, and a password. An elliptic curve cryptography-based public key cryp-
tosystem is used to ensure that a particular legitimate user can only access the information for which
he/she is authorized. We show that our scheme performs better than previously existing user access
control schemes. Through a security analysis, we show that our scheme is secure against possible
known attacks. Furthermore, through a formal security veriﬁcation using the AVISPA (Automated
Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications) tool, we show that our scheme is also
secure against passive and active attacks.
ª 2013 King Saud University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In a wireless body area sensor network (WBAN), miniature
low-power sensor nodes are placed around a patient’s body
for monitoring their body functions and the neighboring envi-
ronment (Ghasemzadeh and Jafari, 2011; Liang et al., 2012;
Otto et al., 2006; Zois et al., 2012). With the help of a WBAN,
a patient’s health related information, including their temper-
ature, respiration, heart rate, pulse oximeter, blood pressure,
blood sugar, and pH can be remotely monitored (Ameen
et al., 2012). To achieve the maximum beneﬁt, this information
must be continuously processed in real time. The medical
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users such as healthcare staff, researchers, government agen-
cies, and insurance companies to make important decisions
such as clinical diagnoses and emergency medical responses
for the patients (Li et al., 2010).
The bio-sensors are placed on a patient’s body to transmit
sensing data through a secure channel to a small body area
network gateway. The gateway then locally processes the data
and resends it through a secure channel to the external net-
work router and then onto the medical server at the hospital.
The results are then observed and analyzed by the medical
staff/doctors charged with monitoring patients. A typical
example of a WBAN is shown in Fig. 1 (Li et al., 2010). In this
scenario, a patient wears various bio-sensors. A centralized
control device is used to transmit data in and out of the net-
work. This control device can also be used as a gateway be-
tween the internal network and the base station. The base
station is connected with the external network.
The communication of health related information between
sensors on a patient’s body in a WBAN over the Internet to
medical servers must be strictly private and conﬁdential
(Alemdar and Ersoy, 2010; Kwak et al., 2009; Seyedi et al.,
2013; Singelee et al., 2008; Venkatasubramanian et al., 2010).
Authenticated medical data transmissions are essential require-
ments for a WBAN because false or unauthenticated medical
information may lead to incorrect treatments or diagnoses for
patients. Therefore, the transmitted information must be en-
crypted to protect patient privacy. In addition, the medical staff
of the hospital that collects the data must be conﬁdent that the
data are unaltered and indeed originate from the speciﬁed pa-
tient. The major challenges in a WBAN are security, robust-
ness, and scalability. The size and resource constraints of the
bio-sensors also play a crucial role in the success and reliability
of aWBAN (Singelee et al., 2008). Health care staff can directlyFigure 1 A general three-tier architeaccess data from the body area network of a patient after
successful authentication. A survey on wireless body area net-
works can be found in Klaoudatou et al. (2011), Latre et al.
(2011) and Otto et al. (2006). Scalability, in terms of number
of sensors and patients, is an important factor in this type of
network. User access control is an essential requirement in pro-
viding security and data privacy for a WBAN.
User access control is critical to the successful operation
and extensive adoption of wireless body area network services.
The security framework for a WBAN should consist of user
authentication (identity veriﬁcation), user authorization (ac-
cess provided to user) and user accountability (monitoring
activity and controlling access) to control user access and pre-
vent different types of attacks. User access control can identify
and impose different access privileges for different types of
users. In a typical WBAN, different doctors, health care staff,
and medical insurance company agents are the major users,
but access to all medical information of a particular patient
may not be required for all types of users. For example, a con-
cerned doctor can retrieve his/her patient’s data but no other
patient information.
This paper considers a WBAN where sensor nodes are sufﬁ-
ciently small and efﬁcient to ensure long battery life. The elec-
tronics of a WBAN sensor node are designed to detect and
transmit low frequency and low amplitude physiological signals.
The sensor node hardware requires a wireless link (AM152100
IC) from an AMI semiconductor used for MICS band genera-
tion. Ameen et al. (2012) compared amedicalWBANand a gen-
eral WSN, clearly mentioning that both general WSNs and
medical WBANs have limited resources in battery, computa-
tion, and memory while both exhibited dynamic network scale,
heterogeneous device ability, and dense distribution. WBAN
sensors are single-function, safe, costly and quality devices,
and WSN sensors are multi-functional, low cost, redundancy-cture of WBAN (Li et al., 2010).
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star network where there is no device redundancy in the deter-
ministic node distribution; the trafﬁc is periodical and unidirec-
tional, and each channel should be a speciﬁc medical channel.
However, a general WSN typically has a large scale hierarchical
network where redundant and random node distributions are
followed. The trafﬁc may be unidirectional or bidirectional,
and it generally follows point-to-point communications where
obstacles are unknown.
1.1. Motivation
Our scheme is motivated by the following considerations. In
WBAN, external parties (users), those are authorized to access
data, should get access as and when they demand. In order to
allow authorized access of the real-time data from the sensor
nodes inside WBAN to the authorized users on demand, there
is a great need for user access control before allowing them to
access the real-time data inside WBAN for which they are per-
mitted. In healthcare applications, monitoring patient’s condi-
tions by the expert doctors is very essential. Thus, real-time
data sensed by the sensors in a patient’s body can be moni-
tored directly by an authorized external user (doctor in that
hospital) as and when demand is made. Based on critical and
emergency situation of the patient, the doctor can take neces-
sary action by instructing the nurses/medical staffs in the hos-
pital for the patient. Hence, before allowing access to the
sensitive and private real-time data of the patients, the external
user (doctor) must be authenticated for a particular access
privilege by the base station (medical server) as well as sensor
node in the network. Considering these points, the user access
control in WBAN for healthcare applications becomes a prom-
inent research ﬁeld.
1.2. Threat model
Based onDasML (2009), we apply theDolev–Yao threatmodel
(Dolev and Yao, 1983) for our scheme, in which two parties
(nodes) communicate over an insecure channel.We adopt a sim-
ilar threatmodelwhere the channel is insecure and the endpoints
(sensor nodes) cannot generally be trustworthy. Finally, we as-
sume that an attacker can eavesdrop on all trafﬁc, inject packets
and reply to previously delivered messages. The base station
(medical server) in our scheme is assumed to be trustworthy
and impervious to attack. Due to cost constraints, the sensors
are not equipped with tamper resistant hardware; if an attacker
compromises any sensor from a patient’s body, he/she can exact
all cryptographic information, including the key materials, data
and code stored on that node. Similar to Das et al. (2012b), we
assume that the compromised (captured) nodes can be detected
and the base station (medical server), users, and sensor nodes
know the IDs of the compromised nodes. As a result, the base
station (medical server) alerts the users to the compromised sen-
sor nodes in the network.
1.3. Our contributions
This paper proposes a new password and group-based user ac-
cess control scheme in wireless body area networks for health
care applications. Our scheme has the following important
properties: It provides password and group-based user authentication
depending on the access rights provided for the genuine
users in WBANs.
 It provides better security compared with the other related
user access control schemes because it supports mutual
authentication between the user and the base station and
sensor node, resists denial-of-service, privileged-insider,
smart card breach and man-in-the-middle attacks.
 It supports dynamic node additions after the initial deploy-
ment of nodes in the network. It also supports new node
deployment for new patients and does not require updated
information from the user’s smart card.
 It supports a local change to the user’s password without
help from the base station (medical server).
 It establishes a secret session key between the user and a
sensor node so that the same key can be used for future
secret communication of real-time data inside the WBAN.
 Through formal security veriﬁcation using the AVISPA
(Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and
Applications) tool, we show that our scheme is also secure
against passive and active attacks such as replay and
man-in-the-middle schemes.
1.4. Organization of the paper
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
review the existing related works on user access control in
WSN as well as works on security in wireless body area net-
works. In Section 3, we propose a novel ECC-based user access
control scheme in WBANs for healthcare and patient monitor-
ing applications. In Section 4, we analyze the functionality and
security properties of our proposed scheme through the infor-
mal and formal security analysis. In Section 5, we simulate our
proposed scheme using the widely-accepted AVISPA tool. We
show that our scheme is secure against passive and active at-
tacks. In Section 6, we compare the performance of our scheme
with other related schemes. We conclude the paper in Section 7.
2. Related work
This section brieﬂy discusses the existing related user access
control schemes that are currently proposed in resource-con-
strained wireless sensor networks.
We use elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for our proposed
user access control scheme for a wireless body area network.
RSA (Rivest et al., 1978) may also be used to authenticate
external users and Difﬁe and Hellman (1976) over DLP
(discrete logarithm problem) used to establish shared keys be-
tween external users and sensor nodes in the network. How-
ever, the evaluation of a 1024-bit modular exponentiation for
the DLP of the form 2x (where x is at least 160 bits) requires
more than 50 s (Malan et al., 2004; Watro et al., 2004) on both
MICA1 and MICA2 motes (Atmel Corporation, 2010). In
Gura et al. (2004), Gura et al. implemented the assembly lan-
guage for ECC and RSA on the Atmel ATmega 128 processor
(Atmel Corporation, 2010), and they showed in their imple-
mentation that a 160 bit-point multiplication of ECC required
0.81 s, whereas 1024-bit RSA public and private key opera-
tions required 0.43 s and 10.99 s, respectively. Compared with
RSA, ECC can achieve the same level of security with a
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rable security to a 1024-bit RSA and a 224-bit ECC provides
the comparable security of a 2048-bit RSA (Rivest et al.,
1992). It was noted in Carman et al. (2000) that the transmis-
sion energy consumption rates in wireless sensor networks are
over three orders of magnitude greater than the energy con-
sumption rates for computing. Therefore, the packet size and
the number of packets in the transmission play a crucial per-
formance role in designing an access control protocol in sensor
networks. If a node is preloaded with the certiﬁcate by the base
station, then the verifying RSA signature in the certiﬁcate
takes less time than the ECC signature veriﬁcation in the cer-
tiﬁcate because the signature will be generated ofﬂine by the
base station prior to the deployment of sensor nodes in the tar-
get ﬁeld. However, compared with a 1024-bit RSA signature
(Rivest et al., 1978), an ECC-based signature (Johnson and
Menezes, 1999; Liao and Shen, 2006) in the certiﬁcate, will
only require a 320-bit signature when a 160-bit ECC is used
in the proposed scheme. This motivates us to use ECC instead
of RSA in our proposed access control scheme so that we can
achieve greater energy and bandwidth savings. Our scheme
uses symmetric key cryptographic techniques along with
ECC to achieve communication and computational efﬁciency.
Wireless body area networks (WBANs) are envisioned to
provide health care and patient monitoring applications in
the near future. This paper addresses the importance of secure
patient data acquisition for different types of users. The pro-
posed authentication scheme consists of multiple phases that
involve the users, the medical server (base station) and the sen-
sors. The users’ access is controlled through the use of binary
mask value assigned to each user during the registration phase.
Exchanged messages among parties are encrypted and signed
using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). The simulation of
the proposed solution has been conducted through the use of
the widely accepted AVISPA tool to evaluate the method
against various known attack scenarios. The formal and infor-
mal security analyses show the protocol’s resilience to known
security attacks.
Wang et al. (2008) split the access control process into a lo-
cal authentication conducted by a group of sensors physically
close to a user and a remote authentication based on the
endorsement of the local sensors. They implemented the access
control protocol on a test bed of TelosB motes (Atmel Corpo-
ration, 2010). Based on ECC, they provided the local authen-
tication. By using certiﬁcate-based authentication, the user
access was veriﬁed by the sensor nodes.
He et al. (2011) proposed a distributed privacy preserving
access control scheme for WSNs. They identiﬁed the character-
istics of a single-owner multi-user sensor network and the
requirements of a distributed privacy preserving access con-
trol. Their scheme was based on a ring signature technique.
The user initially registers with a network owner. The network
owner then divides all users into groups. The same group has
the same access privilege. The network owner maintains a
group access list pool that contains the identity and other
information of each group, and access control is provided
based on the group.
Wen et al. (2011) proposed a user access control scheme for
a wireless multimedia sensor network. In this scheme, an
authorized user can access the real time multimedia data. Their
proposed scheme used Chinese Remainder Theorem-based
group rekeying.Li et al. (2010) discussed various practical issues required to
fulﬁll the security and privacy requirements in WBANs. They
explored the relevant security solutions in sensor networks and
WBANs while analyzing various applications. They proposed
an attribute-based encryption for achieving ﬁne-grained access
control. This is a one-to-many encryption method where the
cipher text is only readable by a group of users that satisfy a
certain access policy.
Mahmud and Morogan (2012) proposed an identity-based
user authentication and access control protocol based on an
identity-based signature (IBS) scheme. They used an ECC-
based digital signature algorithm (DSA) for signing and verify-
ing a message. At initialization, sensor nodes and users were
registered to a base station and group identity and user access
rights were also provided by the base station. User revocation
was implemented through the expiration of user access time as
assigned by the base station at the time of registration. The
authenticated user was not allowed to gain access without
the proper access rights. Though their scheme was secure
against node capture and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, the
password change process was not supported. For new user
additions, the base station needed to rebroadcast user param-
eters such as user ID, group ID and system timestamp, thus
incurring more communication overhead in the network.
Wang et al. (2006) proposed an ECC-based user access con-
trol scheme. In this scheme, the user must register with the key
distribution center (KDC) for access permission prior to
authentication. The KDC maintains a user access list pool with
the respective user’s access privilege. This access privilege con-
sists of user ID, group ID and a user access privilege mask;
multiple users within the same group should have the same ac-
cess privilege. Based on elliptic curve cryptography, the KDC
generates the public key, the private key of the user and the ac-
cess list certiﬁcate, based on the user’s request. The user re-
quests the sensor node by sending the certiﬁcate; the sensor
node then selects one random number as a session key. In this
scheme, the user authenticates a sensor node and a sensor node
also authenticates the user; mutual authentication is thus pro-
vided between the user and the sensor node.
Le et al. (2009) proposed an energy-efﬁcient access control
scheme based on ECC that improved on Wang et al. (2006).
Their scheme was a public key cryptography based access con-
trol scheme where the user must accept access permissions
from a key distribution center (KDC). The KDC maintains
an access control list (ACL) pool and associated user identiﬁ-
cations. The user’s access privileges are deﬁned in the ACL
based on the user’s access privilege mask. The public keys be-
tween the KDC and the sensor nodes are mutually exchanged
during the pre-deployment phase. After registration, the user
gains a public and private key. One signed certiﬁcate of the ac-
cess control list is also issued by the KDC and sent to the user.
The user must then be authenticated by the sensor node for fu-
ture communications.
3. The proposed scheme
In a wireless sensor network that controls user access, a genu-
ine user gains permission to access the network. However, in
real life WBAN scenarios, all users should not have the same
network access privileges. A particular user should only be
able to access required information. To provide controlled user
Figure 2 An example of a user access list.
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utilizing an access list composed of a user identity, a user ac-
cess privilege mask and an access group ID Gid for each user.
Gid represents a unique number to identify a particular access
group. Each access group can access data according to the
privileges given to that particular group. A user access privi-
lege mask is a binary number where each bit represents speciﬁc
information or services that can be accessed by an authenti-
cated user. A sensor node stores and processes information,
sending partially processed information to the next level. An
authenticated user with a lower level of privilege is not allowed
to access higher privilege information (Wang et al., 2008). An
example of a user access list is shown in Fig. 2.
3.1. Notations
We use the notations in this paper to describe our proposed
scheme given in Table 1. The public key of the base station
is KBS = xG, where xG= G+ G+ . . . + G(x times) is called
the elliptic curve scalar multiplication in an elliptic curve Ep(a,
b), which is the set of all points of y2 = x3 + ax+ b(mod p)
such that a, b 2 Zp = {0, 1, 2, . . .,p  1} are constants with
4a3 + 27b2 „ 0(mod p). If nG= O, where O the point at inﬁn-
ity or zero point. Then O is called the order of the base point G
in Ep(a, b) (Koblitz, 1987). Here x is the private key of the base
station. An example of a one-way hash function is SHA-1 (Se-
cure Hash Standard, 1995), which has the above desired prop-
erties (i) to (vi). However, National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) does not recommend SHA-1 for top secret
documents. Further, in 2011, Manuel showed collision attacks
on SHA-1 (Manuel, 2011). As in Das (2012, 2013) one can also
use the recently proposed one-way hash function, QuarkTable 1 Notations used in the proposed scheme.
Symbol Description
SNi Identiﬁer of sensor node i
Uj jth user
BS Base station
PWj Password of user Uj
Gidj Group id of user Uj
APMj Access privilege mask of user Uj
x Private key of base station
KBS Public key of base station
MKSi Master key of sensor node SNi
RMuj Random number for user Uj
Ki Secret key of node SNi shared with BS
H(Æ) Secure one-way collision-resistant hash function
Ti Bootstrapping time for node SNi
AiB Data A concatenates with data B
EK(M) Symmetric encryption using the key K
DK(M) Symmetric decryption using the key K
Xﬁ Y:M Entity X sends message M to entity Y(Aumasson et al., 2010). Quark is a family of cryptographic
hash functions which is designed for extremely resource-con-
strained environments like sensor networks and radio-fre-
quency identiﬁcation (RFID) tags. Like most one-way hash
functions, Quark can be used as a pseudo-random function
(PRF), a message authentication code (MAC), a pseudo-ran-
dom number generator (PRNG), a key derivation function,
etc. Quark is shown to be a much efﬁcient hash function than
SHA-1. However, in this paper, as in Das et al. (2013) we use
SHA-2 as the secure one-way hash function in order to achieve
top security. We may use only 160-bits from the hash digest
output of SHA-2.
3.2. Different phases
This section discusses our proposed user access control
scheme. Our scheme consists of the following phases: pre-
deployment, post-deployment, registration, login, authentica-
tion, password change and dynamic node addition. These
phases are described in the following subsections.
3.2.1. Pre-deployment phase
This phase is used to preload the keying materials to all sensor
nodes prior to their deployment. It is performed ofﬂine by the
(key) setup server. The setup server in our scheme is the base
station (the medical server). This phase is implemented ofﬂine
by the base station prior to the deployment of sensor nodes on
a patient’s body (target ﬁeld). The pre-deployment phase con-
sists of the following steps:
Step P1: The base station selects a set of network parame-
ters from the following: a ﬁnite ﬁeld GF(p) where p is a large
odd prime of at least 160 bits; an elliptic curve Ep(a, b) that
is the set of all points of y2 = x3 + ax+ b(mod p) such that
a, b 2 Zp = {0, 1, 2, . . .,p  1} are constants with
4a3 + 27b2 „ 0 (mod p); and a base point G in Ep(a, b) whose





The base station ﬁrst selects a random number as its own pri-
vate key x 2 Zn where Zn ¼ f1; 2; . . . ; n  1g. The base sta-
tion then computes its public key KBS = xG. Depending on
the probable user query, the base station prepares the group-
based user access privilege mask (APM) and prepares an access
list consisting of the access privilege mask and the respective
access group identity Gid. For each deployed sensor node
SNi, the base station assigns a unique identiﬁer SNi. The base
station also assigns a unique randomly generated master key
MKSi for each deployed sensor node SNi, which is only shared
with the base station. The base station computes xiG= (x1, y1)
for each sensor node SNi where xi is the private key for sensor
node SNi, which is known to the BS. The base station then
computes the secret key Ki = x1 (mod p) for each sensor node
SNi. For security, p is considered as a 160-bit number for ECC.
Note that Ki is also a 160-bit number. However, to use Ki as
the secret key for symmetric key encryption (for example,
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (Advanced Encryption
Standard, 2001)), we can only use 128 bits from the 160 bits
of Ki.
Step P2: Once the set of network parameters are selected,
the base station (BS) loads the following information into
the memory of each sensor node SNi prior to its deployment
in ofﬂine: (i) a unique node identiﬁer SNi; (ii) the elliptic curve
Ep(a, b); (iii) the base point G; (iv) the secret key Ki with xi; (v)
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function H(Æ); and (vii) its own master key MKSi .
3.2.2. Post-deployment phase
This phase helps the sensor nodes and the base station to
establish secure connections between them. As soon as sensor
nodes are deployed, their ﬁrst task is to locate physical neigh-
bors within their communication ranges. For secure communi-
cation between sensor nodes, the nodes must establish pairwise
secret keys between them. Because the major focus in this pa-
per is addressing the user access control problem, we assume
that nodes in a WBAN can establish secret keys by using exist-
ing key establishment schemes. For example, we can use an
unconditionally secure key establishment scheme (Das AK,
2009) for pairwise key establishment between nodes in each
cluster. Because our primary focus is on how authorized users
belonging to different groups (doctors, nurses, medical insur-
ance team, patient parties, etc.) can access the real-time data
for monitoring a patient’s condition from the sensors inside
the WBAN, we require secure communication between the
sensor nodes and the authorized users.
Once deployed, each sensor node sends a message with its
node identity SNi, bootstrapping time Ti, and encrypted infor-
mation containing Ki, SNi and Ti to the base station:
SNi ! BS : hSNi;Ti;EMKSi ðKi;SNi;TiÞi
After receiving the message from the sensor node SNi, the BS
decrypts EMKSi (Ki, SNi, Ti) with the master key MKSi of SNi,
and then checks the validity of the received information Ki,
SNi, and Ti. Note that Ti is the bootstrapping time of the sen-
sor node SNi. The BS further checks if jTi  Ti j < DTi, where
Ti is the current system timestamp of the BS and DTi is the ex-
pected time interval for the transmission delay. If the check
holds, then the BS stores Kiand Ti for the sensor node SNi.
3.2.3. Registration phase
In the registration phase, a user Uj must register with the base
station to access the real-time data from a speciﬁc sensor node
in a WBAN. This phase consists of the following steps:
Step R1: The user selects his/her identity Uj, a password
PWj, his/her access group ID Gidj (depending on his/her access
privilege), and a random number RMuj. Uj generates another
secret random secret value Nj that is kept secret to Uj only.Table 2 The registration phase of our Proposed Scheme.Uj then computes the masked password RPWj = H(NjiPWj)
and sends the message hUj; RPWj; Gidj ; RMuji to the BS
through a secure channel.
Step R2: After receiving the information, the BS calculates
the secret shared hash value RUj ¼ HðRPWjkGidjkRMujÞ for
user Uj.
Step R3: The BS ﬁnally generates a tamper-proof smart
card for user Uj with the following parameters and sends the
smart card to Uj through a secure channel:
BSﬁ Uj: ÆSmartCard(Uj, RMuj, H(Æ), RPWj, Gidj, RUj )æ
The BS stores RUj , Gidj and APMj for user Uj. This registra-
tion phase is summarized in Table 2.
3.2.4. Login phase
This phase allows users to login to the system to access real-
time data from a speciﬁed sensor node in a WBAN. The user
Uj must perform the following steps:
Step L1: At login, the user Uj inserts his/her smart card into
the card reader of a speciﬁc terminal and inputs his/her user ID
Uj, secret value Nj and password PWj, as well as his/her access
group ID Gidj. The smart card then computes the masked pass-
word RPW0j ¼ HðNjkPWjÞ and the hash value
R0Uj ¼ H RPW0jkGidjkRMuj
 
for user Uj, using the stored val-
ues of Gidj, RMuj in the smart card. The smart card checks
whether R0Uj ¼ RUj. If this veriﬁcation does not hold, Uj has en-
tered his/her password incorrectly and the phase terminates
immediately. Otherwise, the smart card computes the hash va-
lue H (RUj iT1) by using the timestamp T1 of the system and
then sends the following message to the BS:
Uj ! BS :< Uj;HðRUjkT1Þ;T1 >
Step L2: After receiving the message in Step L1, the BS
checks whether the condition jT1  T1j < DT1 is valid, where
T1 is the timestamp of the user’s system, T

1 is the current time-
stamp of the BS and D T1 is the expected time interval for the
transmission delay. If it is valid, the BS computes the hash va-
lue H(RUj iT1) using the received timestamp T1 and the previ-
ously computed value of RUj by the BS. The BS then
compares this computed hash value with the received hash va-
lue H(RUj iT1) in the message. If they match, the BS computes
the secret parameter Sj = x+ xiRUj (mod p) and the hash va-
lue KUj = H(SNiiUjiKBSiKi) for all sensor nodes SNi, i= 1,
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(mod p). The BS further computes the shared secret symmetric
key U Kj = H(RUj iUjiT1iT2) with the user Uj and sends the
following message to the user Uj:
BS! Uj : hEUKjðSNi;Sj;Zj;KUjÞ;T1;T2i
Step L3: After receiving the message in Step L2 from the BS,
userUj veriﬁes whether jT2  T2j < DT2 is valid, where T2 is the
timestamp of the BS, T2 the timestamp of the user’s system and
DT2 the expected time interval for the transmission delay. Uj
also checks the received value of T1 with its previous T1. If they
match, it computes the same symmetric keyUKj shared with the
BS with the received value of T1, T2 as
UKj ¼ HðRUjkUjkT1kT2Þ and decrypts EUKjðSNi; Sj; Zj; KUjÞ
to retrieve Sj, Zj, and KUj . Ui then stores the retrieved values
of Sj, Zj, and KUj for authorization purposes with the sensor
node SNj.
Step L4: The BS computes two encrypted messages
EMKSi ðSNi; Uj; ðAPMj  GidjÞ; RUj; T1; T2Þ by using the
master key MKSi of the sensor node SNi and
EKiðSNi; Uj; Gidj ; T1Þ using the key Ki. The BS sends the fol-
lowing message to the sensor node SNi:
BS! SNi
: hSNi; Uj; EMKSiðSNi; Uj; ðAPMj
 GidjÞ; RUj; T1; T2Þ; EKiðSNi; Uj;Gidj; T1Þi
In this case, APMj is the access privilege mask for the access
group ID Gidj for user Uj.
Step L5: When the sensor node SNi receives the message
in Step L4, it decrypts EMKSi (SNi, Uj,(APMj ¯ Gidj), RUj , T1,
T2) by using its own master key MKSi to retrieve the infor-
mation SNi, Uj,(APMj ¯ Gidj), RUj , T1, T2. SNi then checks
the received SNi, Ui, and T2 values by checking the condi-
tion ŒT2  T*Œ< DT2, where T2 is the timestamp of the
base station, T* the timestamp of the sensor node SNi
and DT2 is the expected time interval for the transmission
delay. If all of these conditions are satisﬁed, SNi further de-
crypts EKi(SNi, Uj, Gidj, T1) by using the stored key Ki to
retrieve the information SNi, Uj, Gidj, T1. By using Gidj,
SNi computes APMj = (APMj ¯ Gidj) ¯ Gidj. SNi ﬁnally
saves RUj , T1, T2, Gidj, and APMj for authentication pur-
poses. The login phase of our scheme is summarized in
Table 3.
3.2.5. Authentication phase
The authentication phase is required to authenticate the user
when he/she wants to access real-time data inside a WBAN.
During the login phase, when the user Uj receives the message
in Step L2, Uj saves the values Sj, Zj and KUj for authorization
purposes with the sensor node SNi in Step L3.
Step A1: For authentication, the user Uj computes the en-
crypted value EKUj (SNi, Uj, RUj , Gidj, T1, Sj, Zj) and the hash
value H(T1iSjiZj), sending the following authentication re-
quest message to the sensor node SN:i
Uj ! SNi :
< SNi;Uj;EKUjðSNi;Uj;RUj;Gidj;T1;Sj;ZjÞ;HðT1kSjkZjÞ >
Step A2: After receiving the authentication request message
from user Ujin Step A1, the sensor node SNi performs the
following to verify whether user Uj is legitimate: SNi ﬁrstcomputes the key K0Uj ¼ HðSNikUjkKBSkKiÞ, using the
stored parameters and the received user ID of Uj. Using
the computed key K0Uj;SNi then decrypts EKUj(SNi, Uj,
RUj , Gidj, T1, Sj, Zj) to retrieve the information SNi, Uj,
RUj , Gidj, T1, Sj, ZjSNi further checks whether the retrieved
value of T1 matches with the previously received value of
T1. If they match, SNi computes the hash value H(T1iSjiZj)
and veriﬁes whether this value matches with the received
hash value. If there is a match, SNi then proceeds in exe-
cuting Step A3. Otherwise, the authentication phase imme-
diately terminates.
Step A3: SNi checks the following signature veriﬁcation
equation Zj = SjG (mod p). Note that
Zj ¼ ðKBS þ xiGRUjÞ ¼ ðxGþ xiGRUjÞ ¼ ðxþ xiRUjÞG ¼ SjG:
If the signature veriﬁcation fails, SNi considers user Uj as
illegal and the phase terminates immediately. Otherwise,
the sensor node SNi checks the received Gidj with the value
received from the BS during the login phase. If it is satisﬁed,
SNi computes a secret session key SKij to be shared with the
user Uj as SKij ¼ HðSNikUjkAPMjkGidjkSjkRUjkT1kT2Þ.
Finally, SNi sends an acknowledgment to user Uj and the
BS, and responds to the query of the user Uj, depending
upon the access privilege mask APMj stored for user Uj
using the secret session key SKij.
Step A4: After receiving the acknowledgment from
SNi, user Uj computes the same secret session key SKij
shared with the sensor node SNi using its previous
system timestamp T1, storing T2, Sj, RUj as
SKij ¼ HðSNikUjkAPMjkGidjkSjkRUjkT1kT2Þ. Therefore, both
user Uj and the sensor node SNi will securely communicate
in future using the derived secret session key SKij.
At the end of this phase, SNi deletes RUj , T1, T2, Gidj, and
AP Mj from its memory for security reasons. User Uj also de-
letes Sj and Zj. The authentication phase of our scheme is sum-
marized in Table 4.
3.2.6. Password change phase
In this phase, a user Uj may change his/her password freely
and completely locally for security reasons without contacting
the BS. This phase consists of the following steps:
Step PC1: Uj inputs his/her smart card into the card reader
of a speciﬁc terminal and provides his/her old password PWoldj
and secret number Noldj , as well as new changed password
PWnewj and new secret number N
new
j .
Step PC2: The smart card computes the masked old pass-
word of the user Uj as RPW
old
j ¼ H Noldj kPWoldj
 
and com-
pares this value with the stored value of RPWj in the smart
card. If they do not match, this means that the user Uj has en-
tered his/her old password incorrectly and the password
change phase terminates immediately. Otherwise, the smart
card computes the hash value RoldUj ¼ HðRPWoldj kGidjkRMUjÞ
with the old masked password RPWoldj , group identity Gidj
and random number RMUj. The smart card then further com-
pares this computed hash value RoldUj with the stored value of
RUj . If they match, the smart card executes Step PC3.
Step PC3: The smart card computes the new masked pass-
word RPWnewj ¼ H Nnewj kPWnewj
 
and RnewUj ¼ HðRPWnewj k
GidjkRMUjÞ.
Table 3 The login phase of our proposed scheme
Table 4 Authentication phase of our proposed scheme.
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word RPWj with the new masked password RPW
new
j and the
old hash value RUj with the new hash value R
new
Uj into the mem-
ory of the smart card.
3.2.7. Dynamic node addition phase
New node deployment in sensor networks is inevitable due to
the loss of sensor nodes resulting from power exhaustion after
weeks or months of operation. Some nodes may become com-
promised and require replacement. We assume that one or
more nodes must be deployed in a dynamic node addition
phase.
Let a new sensor node u be deployed during the dynamic
node addition phase. Prior to its deployment, (during the
pre-deployment phase), the BS will preload a set of node
parameters ofﬂine. This set contains (i) a unique node identiﬁerSNu of the node u; (ii) the elliptic curve Ep(a, b); (iii) the base
point G in Ep(a, b); (iv) the secret key Ku with xu for node SNu,
where xu is the private-key of SNu and xuG= (x1, y1) with
Ku = x1(mod p); (v) the base station’s public key KBS; (vi) a
hash function H(Æ); and (vii) its own master key MKSu .
After deployment, SNu sends a message containing its own
identity SNu, the bootstrapping time Tu, and the encrypted
information EMKSu (Ku, SNu, Tu) using the master key MKSu
to the BS:
SNu ! BS :< SNu; Tu; EMKSu ðKu; SNu; TuÞ >
After deployment, SNu establishes pairwise keys between them
in the WBAN by using (Das AK, 2009). Then, SNu authenti-
cates and establishes pairwise symmetric secret keys with user
Uj as described in Sections 3.2.4 and 3.2.5. Therefore, the dy-
namic node addition phase in our scheme is simple and
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station after deployment.
4. Analysis of the proposed scheme
In this section, we perform functionality and security analyses
of our proposed access control scheme.
4.1. Computational overhead
Let tecm, th, tenc, and tdec denote the time required to perform
an elliptic curve scalar multiplication, a one-way hash function
H(Æ), a symmetric key encryption, and a symmetric key decryp-
tion, respectively. During the registration phase, the user Uj
and the BS require the computational overhead th and th,
respectively. In our proposed scheme, during the login and
authentication phases, the user Uj, the BS and the sensor node
SNi require the computational overhead 6th + tdec + tenc,
3th + 2tecm + 2tenc + teca and 3th + 3tdec + tecm, respectively.
The total computational cost becomes 14th + 8tenc/
tdec + 3tecm + teca.
4.2. Communication overhead
We consider the communication overhead of our scheme for
both the login and authentication phase. Based on the login
and authentication phases of our scheme, it is clear that the
sensor node SNi, the BS and the user Uj must exchange four
messages. We have calculated the bitwise and packetwise com-
munication overhead for our proposed scheme during the lo-
gin and authentication phases. For computing the number of
packets required for transmission, we considered a CC2420
transmitter (CC2420:2.4 GHz IEEE 802.15.4, 2011). A
CC2420 transmitter supports a packet size of 128 bytes, i.e.,
1024 bits. To calculate the communication overhead, we used
the bitwise size of different parameters as shown in Table 5.
In Table 6, we calculated the number of bits and packets re-
quired for each message in our scheme during the login and
authentication phases. It should be noted that we required a
communication overhead of 1008 bits and the transmission
of only 4 packets during the login and authentication phases.
4.3. Storage overhead
During the pre-deployment phase described in Section 3.2.1, a
sensor node SNi primarily requires storage space to meet the
following node parameters: a unique node identiﬁer SNi,Table 5 Size (in bits) of different parameters used for our
scheme.
Type Bitwise size
User identiﬁer, Uj 16
Bootstrapping time, Ti 32
Node identiﬁer, SNi 16
Group identiﬁer, Gidj 8
Access privilege mask, APMj 64
Random number, RMuj 32
Hash value 160
Symmetric encryption, EK(M) 128which needs 16 bits; the elliptic curve Ep(a, b), which needs
(160 + 160 + 160) = 480 bits for storing p, a and b values
of 160 bits each (for security reasons, we have considered
160 bits prime p in ECC); the base point G, which needs
(160 + 160) = 320 bits; the secret key Ki with private key xi
for SNi, which needs (160 + 160) = 320 bits; the base station’s
public key KBS, which needs (160 + 160) = 320 bits; and its
own master key MKSi , which needs 128 bits. The total storage
space of the sensor node SNi prior to its deployment becomes
1584 bits.
4.4. Energy consumption
Based on Zhang et al. (2012), we also use the Chipcon CC2420
(CC2420:2.4 GHz IEEE 802.15.4, 2011) conﬁguration that is
widely used in low-rate wireless personal area networks.
Table 7 shows that the CC2420 supports a total of eight trans-
mission power levels and a typical supply current (Zhang et al.,
2012). As noted in Zhang et al. (2012), Ir = 19.7 mA is re-
quired to receive the signal, and the transmission rate is
250 kb/s.
Based on Zhang et al. (2012), we evaluated the energy con-
sumption for communication through the following three-case
model: Case I: Success: both data packets and acknowledg-
ments are successfully transmitted.
Case II: PF: Unsuccessful data packet transmission.
Case III: AF: Successful data packet transmission followed
by an unsuccessful acknowledgment transmission.
According to Zhang et al. (2012), the total energy consump-
tion for communication can be calculated as
EðÞ ¼ EðjSuccessÞ þ EðjPFÞ NPFðÞ þ EðjAFÞ NAFðÞ;
where E(ÆŒSuccess), E(ÆŒPF ), and E(ÆŒAF) represent the en-
ergy required for Case I: successful transmission, Case II:
packet failure, and Case III: acknowledgment failure. NPF(Æ)
denotes the expected number of packet transmission fail-
ures, and NAF(Æ) is the expected number of acknowledg-
ment transmission failures. For a detailed analysis, refer
to Zhang et al. (2012).
4.5. Network scalability
Assume that there will be m cluster heads and m0 controller
nodes in a hierarchical WBAN (HWBAN) as shown in
Fig. 3, representing a hospital ward with multiple patients.
In this ﬁgure, a set of sensor nodes are deployed on a patient’s
body that constitute a WBAN. The WBAN is then associated
with a cluster head, and a set of cluster heads are attached to a
controller node. For example, if a patient’s body is deployed
with 10 regular sensor nodes and there are 1000 patients in var-
ious wards to be monitored in the hospital,
the total number of regular sensor nodes is
10 · 1000 = 10,000. If 5 cluster heads are attached to a con-
troller node in a ward, we require 1000/5 = 200 controller
nodes in the hospital. As a result, the total nodes to be de-
ployed in the HWBAN is 11,200, and these nodes constitute
a large-scale network.
In a case where a patient will be monitored at home, the to-
tal number of regular sensor nodes is 10 in the WBAN and
only one cluster head is required in that WBAN. In both sce-
narios, the access control mechanism remains the same.
Table 7 Transmission power levels of CC2420.
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In this section, we show that our scheme has the ability to tol-
erate various known attacks, which are discussed in the follow-
ing subsections.
4.6.1. Stolen-veriﬁer attack
It should be noted that our scheme does not require any veri-
ﬁer/password table storage for password veriﬁcations. A net-
work insider cannot obtain a user’s password because the BS
and sensor nodes do not maintain any password/veriﬁer table
to validate a user’s login request. During the registration phase
of our scheme, a user securely Uj submits his/her identity Uj
and masked password H(NjiPWj) to the BS. According to
our threat model, the BS is considered to be a trustworthy en-
tity in the network and cannot be compromised by any attack-
er. Because the secret value Nj is only known to user Uj, it is
computationally infeasible for the BS to retrieve PWj from
H(NjiPWj) due to one-way property of the hash function
H(Æ). Therefore, our scheme has the ability to prevent such
an attack.
4.6.2. Many logged-in users with the same login-ID attack
In general, if the systems that maintain the password table ver-
ify the user login, they can be vulnerable to attack. However,
in our scheme, the BS and sensor nodes do not maintain any
veriﬁer table containing passwords for veriﬁcation. In addi-
tion, no passwords are stored in the user’s smart card. At
the time of login, a user Uj must have a valid smart card with
the valid input tuple ÆUj, PWj, Njæ. Note that our scheme re-
quires on-card computation for both password veriﬁcation
and login to the WSN; once the smart card is removed from
the system, the login process is aborted. If two users Ui and
Uj have the same password due to random secret numbers Ni
and Nj used in computation of their masked passwords, they
will have different masked passwords. As a result, even if
two users have the same password, the problem of many
logged-in users with the same login ID does not arise in ourTable 6 Message size and number of packets to be transmitted p
phases.scheme. Thus, our scheme resists the many logged-in users
with the same login-ID attack.
4.6.3. Resilience against node capture attack
We evaluate the ability of our scheme to tolerate compromised
nodes in the network. Let Pe(c) denote the probability that an
adversary compromises a fraction of total secure communica-
tions by capturing c number of sensor nodes in the network. If
Pe(c) = 0, we classify our user access control scheme as uncon-
ditionally secure against node capture attack. If an attacker
captures a sensor node, he/she is able to discern the master
key along with other information from its memory because
the sensor nodes are not equipped with tamper-resistant hard-
ware. However, each node is given a unique randomly gener-
ated master key prior to its deployment and each sensor
node establishes a distinct secret session key with a user. Thus,
the attacker can only respond with false data to a legitimate
user by capturing a sensor node from which the user wants
to access data. However, other non-captured sensor nodes
can still communicate real-time data to legitimate users with
100% secrecy. As a result, the compromise of a sensor node
does not lead to a compromise in any other secure communi-
cation between the user and the non-captured sensor node in
the network; therefore, our scheme provides unconditional
security against node capture attack.er message for our scheme during the login and authentication
Figure 3 An example of a hierarchical body area sensor network.
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the user and the sensor node in the BAN is secured after the
successful authentication process. This key is used between
the sensor and the user to secure the communication channel
for the real-time data transmission. However, when a sensor
node is physically captured by an attacker from a patient’s
body (WBAN), the attacker is able to discern the master key
along with other information from its memory, including the
established session key. As in our threat model discussed in
Section 1.2, the compromised (captured) nodes can be
detected and as a result, the base station (medical server),
users and sensor nodes know the IDs of the compromised
nodes. Consequently, the base station (medical server) alerts
the users with the compromised sensor nodes in the network.
Thus, another new sensor must be deployed in place of the
captured sensor. In this case, with the help of the dynamic
node addition phase described in Section 3.2.7, the newly
deployed sensor will be able to establish a new session key
and be shared with the user after a successful authentication
process.4.6.4. Masquerade attack
In our scheme, an illegal user cannot fabricate the fake login
request message to convince the BS that it is a legal login re-
quest in the login phase. At the time of login, the user must in-
sert his/her smart card into a card reader and then to provide
his/her user ID Uj, secret value Nj, password PWj and access
group ID Gidj . The smart card then computes the masked pass-
word RPW0j ¼ HðNjkPWjÞ and the hash value
R0Uj ¼ HðRPW0jkGidjkRMujÞ for user Uj by using the stored val-
ues of Gidj ;RMUj in the smart card. The smart card checks
whether R0Uj = RUj . If this veriﬁcation passes, user Uj sendsthe login request message ÆUj , H(RUjiT1), T1æ to the BS. To
convince the BS that this is a legal remote login request, the
illegal user must know the value of Nj as well as PWj, Nj,
Gidj , and RMuj. As a result, the attacker does not have the abil-
ity to create a fake login request message on behalf of the ori-
ginal user Uj. Thus, our scheme resists this type of attack.
4.6.5. Replay attack
In this scenario, an attacker may try to pose as a valid user log-
ging into the BS by sending messages that were previously
transmitted by a legal user. However, our scheme utilizes a cur-
rent system timestamp during the login and authentication
phases. A comparison of the previous timestamp with the cur-
rent timestamp of the receiver system withstands these replay
attacks because the expected time interval for the transmission
delay is very short. Moreover, in the login phase, the user
sends the message hUj; HðRUjkT1Þ; T1i to the BS. Because
the attacker cannot change the hash value HðRUjkT1Þ, the at-
tacker also cannot change the value of T1. Thus, an attacker
does not have the ability to successfully replay previously used
messages during the login and authentication phases. As a re-
sult, our scheme resists the replay attack.
4.6.6. Privileged-insider attack
Note that during the registration phase of our proposed
scheme, the user Uj does not send his/her password PWj in
plaintext. The user Uj sends the masked password
RPWj = H(NjiPWj) to the BS. Without knowing the secret va-
lue Ni (which is only known to the user Uj), it is computation-
ally infeasible to retrieve PWj from RPWj due to the one-way
property of the hash function H(Æ). A privileged insider at the
BS does not have the ability to know the password PWj of user
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other servers where Uj could also be a registered user and
use the same password PWj for his/her convenience. Thus,
our scheme protects against such an attack.
4.6.7. Smart card breach attack
As in Fan et al. (2010), the smart card is assumed to be safe
and unable to be cracked; however, there is a risk of smart card
crack. If an attacker/intruder obtains a smart card and cracks
it, we must assume that he/she can obtain its stored informa-
tion, such as Uj, RMuj; HðÞ; RPWj; Gidj , and RUj . However,
the attacker has no feasible way to know user Uj‘s password
PWj from RPWj due to the one-way property of the hash func-
tion H(Æ). Moreover, based on the hash value
RUj ¼ HðRPWjkGidjkRMujÞ, it is also difﬁcult to know PWj
for Uj due to one-way property of the hash function H(Æ).
Therefore, the attacker must guess user Uj’s correct password
PWj and secret number Nj to pass clear the password veriﬁca-
tion during the login phase. In addition, the computation of Nj
at the login phase becomes infeasible due to the one-way prop-
erty of the hash function H(Æ). As a result, our scheme prevents
a smart card breach attack.
4.6.8. Denial-of-service attack
After deployment, the sensor node in our scheme initially
sends a message to the BS to inform its own bootstrapping
time. At the time of authentication, the BS sends an authenti-
cation request message to a speciﬁc sensor node SNi from
which user Uj wants to access real-time data inside the WBAN.
After receiving the request message from user Uj, the sensor
node SNi sends an acknowledgment to the user after successful
authentication. If an attacker blocks the messages from reach-
ing the BS and sensor nodes, the BS and sensor node will know
about the malicious dropping of these control messages.
Therefore, the denial-of-service attack is not possible in our
scheme because an acknowledgment is sent to user Uj at the
end of user authentication.
4.6.9. Formal security proof of the proposed scheme
This section shows through a formal security analysis that our
scheme is secure against an attacker deriving the user’s pass-
word and the base station’s private key. For this purpose, we
deﬁne the following formal deﬁnitions:
Deﬁnition 1. (One-way hash function). There exists a secure
one-way hash function H:Xﬁ Y, where X= {0,1}* and
Y= Zp
* = {aŒ0 < a< p and gcd(a, p) = 1} satisfying the
following requirements (Stallings, 2003):
(i) For a given y 2 Y, it is hard to ﬁnd an x in X such that
H(x) = y.
(ii) For a given x 2 X, it is hard to ﬁnd another x0 in X, with
x0 „ x, such that H(x0) =H(x).
(iii) It is hard to ﬁnd a pair x, x0) 2 X · X, with x0 „ x, such
that H(x0) = H(x).
As deﬁned in Sarkar (2010), Stinson (2006), a collision-
resistant one-way hash function H:Xﬁ Y, where X= {0,1}*
and Y= {0, 1}n, is considered as a deterministic algorithm
that takes an input as an arbitrary length binary stringX= {0,1}0 and produces an output y 2 {0,1}n as a binary
string of ﬁxed-length, n. If AdvHASHA ðtÞ denotes an adver-
sary (attacker) A’s advantage in ﬁnding collision, we then
have
AdvHASHA ðtÞ ¼ Pr½ðx; x0Þ(RA : x–x0;HðxÞ ¼ Hðx0Þ;
where Pr[E] denotes the probability of a random event E,
and (x, x0) RA denotes the pair (x, x0) is selected ran-
domly by A. In this case, the adversary A is allowed to
be probabilistic and the probability in the advantage is
computed over the random choices made by the adversary
A with the execution time t. We call the hash function
H(Æ) collision-resistant if AdvH ASHA(t) 6 2 , for any sufﬁ-
ciently small 2> 0.
Deﬁnition 2. (Indistinguishability of encryption and chosen
plaintext attack (IND-CPA)). As in Wu and Chen (2012), we
deﬁne the indistinguishability of encryption (IND) and chosen-
plaintext attack (CPA) as follows. Let SE/ME be the single/
multiple eavesdropper, respectively, and Ok1, Ok2, . . .,OkN be
N different independent encryption oracles associated with
encryption keys k1, k2, . . .,kN, respectively. Deﬁne the advan-
tage functions of SE and ME, respectively as:
Adv
ind-cpa
X;SE ðlÞ ¼ 2Pr½SE Ok1; ðm0; m1 RSEÞ; h‹R{0,1}; c‹R
Ok1(mh):SE(c) = h]  1, and Advind-cpaX;ME ðlÞ ¼ 2Pr½ME Ok1;
. . . ; OkN; (m0, m1‹RME); h‹R{0,1}; c1‹ROk1(mh), . . .,
cN‹ROkN(mh):ME (c1, . . .,cN) = h]  1 where X is the encryp-
tion scheme. Then, we say that the encryption scheme X is
IND-CPA secure in the single (multiple) eavesdropper setting
if Advind-cpaX;SE ðlÞ (respectively, Advind-cpaX;ME ðlÞÞ is negligible (in the
security parameter l) for any probabilistic, polynomial time
(PPT) adversary SE (ME).
Deﬁnition 3. (Elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem
(ECDLP)). We deﬁne the elliptic curve discrete logarithm
problem (ECDLP) formally given in Das et al. (2012a). Let
Ep (a,b) be an elliptic curve modulo a prime p. Let P 2 Ep(a,b)
and Q= kP 2 Ep(a,b) be two points, where k 2 RZp (We use
the notation a 2 RB to denote that a is chosen randomly from
the set B).Instance : ðP;Q; rÞ for some k; r2R Zp:
Output : Yes; if Q ¼ rP; i:e:; k ¼ r; and output No; otherwise:
Dreal ¼ fk2RZp;A ¼ P;B ¼ Qð¼ kPÞ;C ¼ k : ðA;B;CÞg;
Drand ¼ fk; r2RZp;A ¼ P;B ¼ Qð¼ kPÞ;C ¼ r : ðA;B;CÞg:
The advantage of any probabilistic, polynomial-time, 0/1-val-
ued (false/true-valued) distinguisher D in solving ECDLP on
Ep(a, b) is deﬁned as
AdvECDLPD;Epða;bÞ ¼ jP r½ðA;B;CÞ  Dreal : DðA;B;CÞ ¼ 1
P r½ðA;B;CÞ  Drand : DðA;B;CÞ ¼ 1j;
where the probability Pr[Æ] is taken over the random choices
of k and r. D is said to be a (t, 2)-ECDLP distinguisher
for Ep(a, b) if D runs at most in time t such that
AdvECDLPD;Epða;bÞðtÞP2.
ECDLP assumption: There exists no (t, 2 )-ECDLP distin-
guisher for Ep(a, b). In other words, for every probabilistic,
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AdvECDLPD;Epða;bÞðtÞ 62 for any sufﬁciently small 2> 0.
We deﬁne the following three random oracles for the at-
tacker (adversary) A:
Reveal1: This unconditionally outputs k from given points
P and Q= kP in an elliptic curve Ep(a,b).
Reveal2: This unconditionally outputs the plaintext mes-
sage M using symmetric-key cryptosystem X with the help of
the relevant public parameters and cipher text message
Ekey(M), without knowing the symmetric key, key.
Reveal3: This unconditionally outputs the input x from the
corresponding hash value y=H(x).Theorem 1. Let the used symmetric encryption scheme X be
IND-CPA. Our scheme is then secure against deriving a user’s
password by an attacker under the assumption that the one-way
hash function H(Æ) closely behaves like a random oracle.
Proof. We follow the similar proof as in Das et al. (2012a) and
Odelu et al. (2013). We must construct an adversary A that can
correctly derive the user Uj’s password PWj. For this purpose,
the adversary A runs the experiment given in Algorithm 1 for
our proposed user access control scheme UACS.
We deﬁne the success probability for EXP1HASH;IND-CPAUACS;A
provided in Algorithm 1 as
Succ1HASH;IND-CPAUACS;A ¼ j2Pr½EXP1HASH;IND-CPAUACS;A ¼ 1  1j:
The advantage function for this experiment is given by
Adv1HASH;IND-CPAUACS;A ðt1; qR2 ; qR3 Þ ¼ maxA fSucc1
HASH;IND-CPA
UACS;A g;
where the maximum is taken over all A with the execution time
t1, and the number of queries qR2 made to the Reveal2 oracle
and the number of queries qR3 made to the Reveal3 oracle.
Our scheme is probably secure against an adversary A for
deriving a user’s password by an attacker, if
Adv1HASH;IND-CPAUACS;A ðt1; qR2 ; qR3Þ 6 e, for any sufﬁciently small
e > 0.
Finally, consider the experiment EXP1HASH;IND-CPAUACS;A .
According to this experiment, if the adversary A can correctly
derive the private key of the BS, he/she can win the game.
However, it is computationally infeasible due to the difﬁcultyin solving the one-way hash function and the indistinguishabil-
ity of the encryption and chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA).
As a result, Adv1HASH;IND-CPAUACS;A ðt1; qR2 ; qR3Þ 6 e, for any sufﬁ-
ciently small 2> 0, as it is dependent on Advind-cpaX;ME ðlÞ and the
difﬁculty of inverting the one-way hash function, i.e.,
AdvHASHA ðtÞ. Therefore, our scheme is probably secure against
an attacker deriving a user’s password. h
Algorithm 1.Theorem 2. Let the used symmetric encryption scheme X be
IND-CPA. Under the ECDLP assumption, our scheme is secure
against an attacker deriving the base station’s private key if the
hash function H() closely behaves like a random oracle.
Proof. We must construct an adversary A that can correctly
derive the base station BS’s private key x. For this purpose,
the adversary A runs the experiment Exp2HASH;IND-CPA;ECDLPUACS;A
given in Algorithm 2 for our proposed user access control
scheme UACS.
We deﬁne the success probability for the experiment in
Algorithm 2 asSucc2HASH;IND-CPA;ECDLPUACS;A ¼ j3Pr Exp2HASH;IND-CPA;ECDLPUACS;A ¼ 1
 
 1j:
The advantage function for this experiment is given by






where the maximum is taken over all A with the execution time
t2, and the number of queries qR1 , qR2 , qR3 made to the Reveal1,
Reveal2 and Reveal3 oracles, respectively. Our scheme is called
probably secure against an adversary A deriving the base sta-
tion’s private key if
Adv2HASH;IND-CPA;ECDLPUACS;A ðt2; qR1 ; qR2 ; qR3Þ 6 e;
for any sufﬁciently small e > 0.
194 S. Chatterjee et al.Algorithm 2.Consider the experiment Exp2HASH;IND-CPA;ECDLPUACS;A . Accord-ing to the experiment, if the adversary A can correctly derive
the user password, he/she can win the game. However, it is
computationally infeasible due to the difﬁculty of solving
the one-way hash function, the indistinguishability of the
encryption and chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA) and the
elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP). As a re-
sult, Adv2HASH;IND-CPA;ECDLPUACS;A ðt2; qR1 ; qR2 ; qR3Þ 6 e, for any sufﬁ-
ciently small e > 0, because it is dependent on
Advind-cpaX;ME ðlÞ;AdvECDLPD;Epða;bÞ (t) and AdvHASHA ðtÞ. Therefore, our
scheme is probably secure against an attacker deriving the
private key of the BS.5. Formal security veriﬁcation of our scheme using AVISPA
back-ends
In this section, we only simulate our scheme for the formal
security analysis. We do not simulate communication, compu-
tation and energy cost of our scheme, since these are evaluated
extensively theoretically in this paper. Through the simulation
results using the widely-accepted AVISPA tool we show that
our scheme is secure against passive and active attacks includ-
ing the replay and man-in-the-middle attacks. For this pur-
pose, we ﬁrst describe in brief the AVISPA tool, implement
our scheme in the high level language, called HLPSL and
simulate the implemented protocol to show that our scheme
is secure.
5.1. AVISPA tool
AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Proto-
cols and Applications) (Armando, 2005) is a widely-acceptedand powerful tool for the formal security veriﬁcation of a pro-
tocol, which ensures whether the protocol is secure or not.
Model checking methods are used to search for states of the
system whether some properties are violated or not. Model
checking tools have been successfully employed to detect at-
tacks on security protocols (Basin et al., 2005). We have used
AVISPA back-ends for our formal security veriﬁcation. AVI-
SPA implements four different back-ends and abstraction-
based methods which are integrated through the high level
protocol speciﬁc language, known as HLPSL (von Oheimb,
2005). A static analysis is performed to check the executability
of the protocol, and then the protocol and the intruder actions
are compiled into an intermediate format (IF). This intermedi-
ate format is the start point for the four automated protocol
analysis techniques. IF is a lower level language than HLPSL
and it is read directly by the back-ends to the AVISPA tool.
The back-ends are used to provide protocol falsiﬁcation,
bounded and unbounded veriﬁcation. The ﬁrst back-end,
called the On-the-ﬂy Model-Checker (OFMC), does several
symbolic techniques to explore the state space in a demand-dri-
ven way. The second back-end, called the CL-AtSe (Con-
straint-Logic-based Attack Searcher), provides a translation
from any security protocol speciﬁcation written as transition
relation in intermediate format into a set of constraints which
are effectively used to ﬁnd whether there are attacks on proto-
cols. Third back-end, called the SAT-based Model-Checker
(SATMC), builds a propositional formula which is then fed
to a state-of-the-art SAT solver and any model found is trans-
lated back into an attack. Finally, TA4SP (Tree Automata
based on Automatic Approximations for the Analysis of Secu-
rity Protocols) is the ﬁnal back-end, which approximates the
intruder knowledge by using regular tree languages.
HLPSL is a role-oriented language, in which each principal
is implemented in transitional roles where the transitions of a
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protocol session is considered as a parallel composition of
these transitional roles. The intruder is modeled using the Do-
lev–Yao model (Dolev and Yao, 1983) (as in our threat model)
with the possibility for the intruder to assume a legitimate role
in a protocol run. The role system also deﬁnes the number of
sessions, the number of principals and the roles.
5.2. Specifying our scheme
We have implemented our scheme in the HLPSL language. In
this implementation, we have three basic roles, namely alice,
server and bob, which represent the participants: the sensor
node SNi, the BS and the user Uj, respectively. We have also
deﬁned the session and environment in our scheme.
Fig. 4 illustrates the role speciﬁcation for user Uj in HLPSL.
During the registration phase, Uj sends the message
hUj;RPWj;Gidj ;RMuji securely to the BS with the Snd( ) opera-
tion. The type declaration channel (dy) indicates the channel for
theDolev–Yao threatmodel (as described in our threatmodel in
Section 1.2). Uj then waits for the smart card containing the se-
cure information in the message ÆUj, RMuj, H(Æ), RPWj, Gidj,
RUj æ from the BS from the Rcv( ) operation. The intruder will
have the ability to intercept, analyze, and/or modify messages
transmitted over the insecure channel. During the login phase,Figure 4 Role speciﬁcation in HLPSL for the user Uj of our
scheme.Uj sends the login request message ÆUj, H(RUj iT1), T1)æ to the
BS. In reply, the BS sends the message ÆEU Kj(SNi, Sj, Zj, KUj),
T2, T1æ to Uj. During the authentication phase, Uj ﬁnally sends
the authentication request message hSNi; Uj; Zj; Sj;
EKUjðSNi; Uj; RUj ; Gidj ; T1; Sj;ZjÞ;HðT1kSjkZjÞi to the sen-
sor node SNi.
Fig. 5 shows the role speciﬁcation for the BS in the HLPSL
language. During the post-deployment phase, the BS receives
the message ÆSNi, Ti, EMKSi (Ki, SNi, Ti)æ from the sensor node
SNi. During the registration phase after receiving the message
ÆUj,RPWj,Gidj,RMujæ securely from the userUj, the BS securely
sends the smart card containing the information in the message
ÆUj, RMuj, H(Æ), RPWj, Gidj, RUj æ to the user Uj. In the login
phase, when the BS receives the message ÆUj, H(RUj iT1), T1)æ
from the user Uj, the BS sends the messages ÆEUKj(SNi, Sj, Zj,
KUj), T2, T1æ to Uj and hSNi; Uj; EMKSi ðSNi; Ui;ðAPMj  GidjÞ; RUj ; T1;T2Þ; EKiðSNi; Uj; Gidj ; T1Þi to the
sensor node SNi.
In Fig. 6, we have implemented the role speciﬁcation for the
sensor node SNi in the HLPSL language. In the post-deploy-
ment phase, the sensor node SNi sends the message ÆSNi,Ti,
EMKSi (Ki,SNi, Ti)æ to the BS. In the login phase, the sensorigure 5 Role speciﬁcation in HLPSL for the BS of our scheme.F
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Mj ¯ Gidj), RUj ,T1, T2),EKi(SNi, Uj,Gidj,T1)æ from the BS. Dur-
ing the authentication phase, the sensor node receives the
authentication request message ÆSNi,Uj,Zj,Sj, EKUj
(SNi,Uj,RUj ,Gidj,T1,Sj,Zj), H(T1iSj iZj)æ from the user Uj.
Witness (A, B, ID, E) declares for a (weak) authentication
property of A by B on E, declares that agent A is witness for
the information E; this goal will be identiﬁed by the constant
ID in the goal section. Request (B, A, ID, E) demands a strong
authentication property of A by B on E, declares that agent B
requests a check of the value E; this goal will be identiﬁed by
the constant ID in the goal section. The intruder is always de-
noted by i.
Finally, the speciﬁcations in the HLPSL language for the
role of session, goal and environment are speciﬁed in Figs. 7
and 8. In the session segment, all of the basic roles––alice, ser-
ver and bob––are instanced with concrete arguments. The top-
level role (environment) is always deﬁned in the speciﬁcation of
the HLPSL language. This role contains the global constants
and a composition of one or more sessions, where the intruder
may play some roles as legitimate users. The intruder also par-
ticipates in the execution of protocol as a concrete session.Figure 6 Role speciﬁcation in HLPSL for the sensor SNi of our
scheme.The current version of HLPSL supports the standard
authentication and secrecy goals. In our scheme, six secrecy
goals and four authentications are veriﬁed. We simulated our
scheme for OFMC and CL-AtSe back-ends using the AVISPA
web tool (AVISPA, 2013). The simulation results are shown in
Figs. 9 and 10. The summary of the results are as follows:
 OFMC reports the protocol is safe.
 CL-AtSe reports the protocol is safe.
Thus, it is clear that our scheme is secure against passive
and active attacks, including the replay and man-in-the-middle
attacks.Figure 8 Role speciﬁcation in HLPSL for the goal and
environment of our scheme.
Figure 7 Role speciﬁcation in HLPSL for the session of our
scheme.
Figure 10 The result of the analysis using CL-AtSe.
Table 8 Time complexity of various operations in terms of
tmul.
tecm 	 1200tmul tsigver 	 2405.36tmul ti 	 3tmul
tadd is negligible th 	 0.36tmul tenc 	 0.15tmul
tdec 	 0.15tmul tecenc 	 2405tmul tecdec 	 1205tmul
tmac 	 th tsiggen 	 1204.36tmul teca 	 5tmul
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This section compares the performance of our scheme with rel-
evant existing access control schemes such as Mahmud et al.’s
scheme (Mahmud and Morogan, 2012), Wang et al.’s scheme
(Wang et al., 2006) and Le et al.’s scheme (Le et al., 2009).
6.1. Comparison of computational costs
We have used the notations for computational cost compari-
sons between our scheme and other schemes provided in
Table 8. tecm, teca, ti, tadd, tmul, th, tenc, tdec, tecenc, tecdec, tmac,
tsiggen, and tsigver denote the time taken for performing one
ECC point multiplication over a ﬁnite ﬁeld GF (2163), an
ECC point addition over a ﬁnite ﬁeld GF (2163), a modular in-
verse over a ﬁnite ﬁeld GF (2163), a modular addition over a
ﬁnite ﬁeld GF (2163), a modular multiplication over ﬁnite ﬁeld
GF (2163), a hashing operation H(Æ), an AES encryption, an
AES decryption, an ECC encryption over a ﬁnite ﬁeld GF
(2163), an ECC decryption over a ﬁnite ﬁeld GF (2163), a
MAC operation, an ECC signature generation over ﬁnite ﬁeld
GF (2163), and an ECC signature veriﬁcation over a ﬁnite ﬁeld
GF (2163), respectively. For the sake of simplicity, we consid-
ered the time taken for one MAC operation as that for one
hashing operation. The quantitative analysis of Koblitz et al.
(2000) shows that the computation of a multiplication point re-
quires approximately 1200 ﬁeld multiplications; an elliptic
curve point addition requires one ﬁeld inversion and two ﬁeld
multiplications; the computation of a ﬁeld inversion requires
approximately three ﬁeld multiplications; the computation of
elliptic curve encryption and decryption require approximately
2405 and 1205 ﬁeld multiplications, respectively (DeWin et al.,
1996; Schroeppel et al., 1995); and the cost of ﬁeld addition is
negligible. Furthermore, a 1024-bit modular multiplication
takes 41 times longer than a ﬁeld multiplication in a ﬁnite ﬁeld
GF (2163). The results of Wong et al. (2001) show the speed for
AES encryption and decryption, hash function using SHA-1
and 1024-bit modular multiplication. In Table 8, the time com-
plexity of various operations in terms of tmul are listed accord-
ing to the analysis results reported in Wu and Chen (2012).Figure 9 The result of the analysis using OFMC.We have compared the computational complexity using
both formulated results and a rough quantitative analysis in
Table 9 for different phases: the registration, login and authen-
tication phases of Le et al. (2009), Wang et al. (2006), Mahmud
and Morogan (2012), and our scheme. It is clear that, com-
pared with the other existing schemes, the computational cost
of our scheme is signiﬁcantly lower. Thus, our scheme is more
suitable for resource-constrained sensor nodes.
6.2. Comparison of communication costs
In Table 10, we compared the communication costs between
our scheme and the other related schemes (Le et al., 2009;
Wang et al., 2006; Mahmud and Morogan, 2012) in terms of
the total number of bits and the total number of packets re-
quired for transmissions during all phases. The table shows
that our scheme requires six message exchanges; among those
where a sensor node is directly involved, only one message
transmission is required, compared with the other schemes
where a sensor node is directly involved. As a result, our
scheme is signiﬁcantly efﬁcient in terms of communication
costs as compared with the other related schemes.
I1: Total number of bits transmission required for messages
of all phases for the schemes; I2: Total number of packets
transmissions during all phases for the schemes; I3: Total num-
ber of message transmissions during all phases for the schemes.
We further calculated the total number of bits required for
all of the messages during all phases for the access control
Table 9 Comparison of computational costs for different phases in different access control schemes.




Registration Uj - - - th
BS 2tecm + tsiggen th + 3tecm + tmul
+ teca
th th
SNi - - - -
Login +
Authentication
Uj th + tsigver+ tmac tecm + 2tmac th+ tsigver 6th + tdec + tenc
BS 2tsigver + 2tmac + 2th - - 3th + 2tecm + 3tenc + tena
SNi 3tmac + th teca + 3tecm + th
+ 2tmac
2th+ tsiggen + tsigver 3th + tecm + 3tdec
Total Cost 4th + 2tecm + 4thsigver + 6tmac 2th + 7tecm + tmul
+ 2teca+ 4tmac
4th+ 2tsiggen + 2tsigver 14th + 8tenc/tdec + 3tecm + teca
Rough Estimation 12025.04tmul 8413.16tmul 7220.88tmul 3611.24tmul
Table 10 Comparison of communication costs between the
proposed scheme and the other schemes.
Scheme I1 I2 I3
Le et al. (2009) 2208 7 7
Mahmud and Morogan (2012) 1132 5 5
Wang et al. (2006) 2544 6 6
Ours 1400 6 6
198 S. Chatterjee et al.schemes. We also calculated the number of packets required
for transmission of a message for the CC2420 transceiver
(CC2420:2.4 GHz IEEE 802.15.4, 2011) which supports a
packet size of 128 bytes, i.e., 1024 bits. The results shown in
Table 10 demonstrate that our scheme is also efﬁcient com-
pared with other related schemes.
6.3. Comparison of energy costs
Because sensor nodes are resource-constrained, we primarily
considered the energy costs of a sensor node during the login
and authentication phases. We compared the energy costs of
a sensor node during the login and authentication phases
between our scheme, Le et al.’s scheme (Le et al., 2009),
Mahmud–Morogan’s scheme (Mahmud and Morogan, 2012)
and Wang et al.’s scheme (Wang et al., 2006) in Table 11. As
in Chatterjee et al. (in press), Das et al. (2012b), the energy
costs of a sensor node consider both the computational and
communication costs involved during the login and authenti-Table 11 Comparison of energy costs of a sensor node during the
schemes.
Scheme Sensor node’s energy cost
Le et al. (2009) three MAC operations +
Mahmud and Morogan (2012) one ECC-point addition +
two MAC operations + th
Wang et al. (2006) two hash operations + on
two message transmission
Ours three hash operations + o
no message transmissionscation phases. In wireless communication, the energy for sen-
sor nodes primarily goes towards the transmission and
reception of messages/packets rather than computing. Because
our scheme requires no message or packet transmissions dur-
ing the login and authentication phases (compared with the
other schemes), the energy spent by sensor nodes is signiﬁ-
cantly less compared with those schemes.
6.4. Comparison of functionality
This section compares the functionality of our scheme with
schemes (Le et al., 2009; Wang et al. (2006); Mahmud and
Morogan (2012)) in Table 12. It is noted that Le et al.’s scheme
(Le et al., 2009) is based on ECC; it supports session key estab-
lishment between the user and the sensor node and mutual
authentication between the user and the sensor node. Their
scheme does not support a user’s password change or a dy-
namic sensor node addition phase after initial deployment.
In Wang et al.’s scheme (Wang et al., 2006), ECC is used as
the cryptographic technique. It supports session key establish-
ment between the user and the sensor node and mutual authen-
tication between the user and the sensor node, but it does not
support a user’s password change or dynamic sensor node
addition phase after initial deployment. In Mahmud–Moro-
gan’s scheme (Mahmud and Morogan, 2012), an identity-
based signature approach with ECC is the basis for the crypto-
graphic technique. As in other schemes, their scheme supports
session key establishment between the user and the sensor node
and mutual authentication between the user and the sensor
node, but it does not support a user’s password change or dy-login and authentication phases between our scheme and other
one hash operation + three message transmissions
three ECC-point multiplication + one hash operation +
ree message transmissions
e ECC-signature generation + two ECC-signature veriﬁcations +
s
ne ECC-point multiplication + three symmetric-key decryptions +
Table 12 Comparison of functionality analysis between the proposed scheme and the other schemes.
Scheme Le et al. (2009) Wang et al. (2006) Mahmud and Morogan (2012) Ours
Cryptographic technique ECC ECC IBS with ECC Hybrid (ECC with symmetric-key
cryptosystem)
Session key establishment Supported Supported Supported Supported
User password change Not available Not available Not available Supported
Dynamic sensor node addition Not available Not available Not available Supported
Mutual authentication between user
and sensor node
Supported Supported Supported Supported
A novel and efﬁcient user access control scheme for wireless body area sensor networks 199namic sensor node addition phase after initial deployment.
Our scheme uses a hybrid approach of both ECC and symmet-
ric-key cryptosystem (AES) for communication and computa-
tional efﬁciency, compared with other schemes. Our scheme
supports session key establishment between the user and the
sensor node and mutual authentication between the user and
the sensor node. In addition, our scheme supports a user’s
password change and a dynamic sensor node addition phase
after initial deployment, which are important requirements
for an ideal user access scheme designed for WSNs. Further-
more, our scheme provides for mutual authentication between
the BS and the sensor nodes.
7. Conclusion
This paper proposed a new user access control scheme suit-
able in wireless body area networks for healthcare and pa-
tient monitoring applications. The proposed scheme allowed
the user to authenticate at the sensor node inside a WBAN
under certain access privileges. After successful authentica-
tion, both the user and the sensor node from which the user
wants to access real-time data can establish a secret session
key between them. By using this session key, the user can la-
ter contact the sensor node for the real-time data inside the
WBANs. Our scheme provides unconditional security against
node capture attack and also prevents other known attacks
such as denial-of-service, masquerade, stolen-veriﬁer, many
logged-in users with the same login-ID, replay, privileged in-
sider, smart card breach, and man-in-the-middle attacks. The
proposed scheme supports a dynamic node addition phase;
there is no need to update stored information in the user’s
smart card for accessing real-time data from the added/re-
placed sensor nodes in the network. Using a AVISPA tool,
we showed that our scheme is secure against both passive
and active attacks, including the replay and man-in-the-mid-
dle attacks. Our scheme also supports other features such as
freely and locally changing the password by the user without
contacting the BS for any security reasons, and other existing
schemes do not support this feature. Our scheme also sup-
ports a dynamic sensor node addition after initial deploy-
ment, whereas other existing approaches do not have this
important feature. Our scheme is also efﬁcient in terms of
communication, computation, storage and energy overheads.
Overall, the higher security and the lower communication
and computational costs make our scheme much more appro-
priate for practical applications in the emerging healthcare
ﬁeld compared with other existing approaches.Acknowledgements
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